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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2008

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EN in  
3 June 1958

Memorandum for the Record

Subject: Talk with Dr. Ernst BRUECKNER, director of Sicherungsgruppe of BKA

On the evening of 27 May 1958 at the home of [REDACTED], I talked to Dr. B., who is here in advance of the trip of President HEUSS, checking up on the security arrangements for the trip. The following information was obtained:

1. Security Group

a. The present strength is 180; no vacancies in the T/O; the morale is much better now that all are in the new building. Also the SG appears to be more active attracting more attention since moving to its new quarters.

*bhannes*  
*6.1 Jan 1958 Berlin*

→ b. Hans HOSSPACH has left the SG for the ENI "as an intel officer". (Comment: assume this means that he will be somewhere in CE work rather than in physical or personnel security. Additional info can be obtained from CARZVEL on H's background if necessary.)

c. The next step for Dr. B. is the achievement of status independent of the BKA, but still under the ENI for purposes of training, personnel, budget, transportation, etc. He is well aware of the unique status he enjoys being administered by the ENI but under the operational orders of the OBA, which in effect gives him considerable freedom of action. He wishes only to be cut from under the ~~numerous~~ criminal police ~~jurisdiction~~ label of the BKA and be established as an independent Federal Executive agency. (Comment: *Rechtsposition*)

In this connection he mentioned that political police had functioned efficiently in the past in connection with intelligence and security agencies and he felt they could again. There is little question but that a good part of Dr. B.'s desire is a matter of prestige to him.)

d. He says the relations with the Land police agencies are improving steadily. As a contributing factor, he mentioned a conference he arranged in the fall of 1957 in Goslar. He first convinced Gehlen to speak, then told Schrubbers [REDACTED]

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G was coming, so Schruebbers came too. Confronted with these two leading lights, the Oberbundesanwalt sent Bundesanwalt WAGNER, his expert on Landesverrat. All LfV chiefs attended except Riedmaier of Bavaria who sent his deputy, Max NOETH. President DULLIEN of the EKA opened the meeting, MOSHEIM of the BMI spoke and DULLIEN then turned the chair over to Dr. B. who presided through the rest of the conference (3 days?). As an example of the attitude of the BMI hierarchy's attitude both toward him personally ~~and~~ he said Dullien had told him afterwards that BARGATZKY of the BMI had commented to him (D) ~~that~~ he was wrong in allowing Dr. B to chair the meeting, ~~knowing~~ in view of B's known ambition for power. He stated that for this reason he must keep from sticking his neck out too far.

e. SG has begun making a collection of handwriting samples in connection with all espionage cases. ~~This~~ Material collected from DID's, found in raided apartments and taken from confessed agents is classified for future use.

The purpose of this exercise is ~~to~~ supplement fingerprint files, since fingerprints are usually not obtainable until a criminal (agent) is captured. Proper classification and use of these/files may ~~possibly~~ serve as a useful tool in gaining a psychological advantage in interrogation of captured hostile agents. At present three men are being trained in the techniques of handwriting classification (6 mos.)

OF TSS  
WILL CHECK  
WHETHER  
B CAN SEE  
WATE HOUSE *W*  
CLASSIFICATION  
SET-UP

f. In answer to a question B said the SG is working on ~~this~~ a statistical compilation of the incidence of criminality in espionage cases. The statistics are bound to be incomplete, since they are based at the moment solely on the cases the SG had handled (some 200 in 57). To get a more accurate reading, it is necessary to get a better reporting system imposed on the Laender. At the moment, the BfV is the authorized ~~recipient~~ recipient of this kind of info from Laender, but B says Schruebbers is perfectly willing that in this field the SG do the work. As of 1 Jan 1959, B hopes

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to have the new Fedrep-wide reporting system worked out. (Comment: We should get more details on this.) We will get a copy of the present report when it is finished.

2. Liaison with U.S.

- a. Still has good social contact with U.S. agencies, including us. Likes Schmitz and sees Schubert fairly frequently. Has noted contact with U.S. agencies has largely dropped to cases where there is a specific U.S. interest involved. (Comment: I pointed out to him we no longer had the need for the vacuum cleaner approach to this problem, since the deflection of GLASSL and the introduction of order into our MfS files; and that we therefore were interested primarily in new facets of MfS work or the confirmation of items hitherto only suspected or incompletely reported. I said we would, however, try to give him a better idea of precisely the kind of info we needed, as well as a better appreciation of wherein we could now be more helpful to him. I told him we were experimenting with the application of machine methods to MfS information and had high hopes for it. He was interested, but did not push hard on the subject, apparently having been cooled down on this subject by the examination made by the RWA of this problem. Furthermore, he said his files were not yet voluminous enough so he had to worry about it. He feels as a result of the GLASSL material he is pretty well up on MfS developments, but concedes he has not had the chance to digest it and put it together with other information)
- b. He made no complaint about the infrequency of CIA liaison, but clearly misses the opportunity to exchange views and thus, as he fancies, keep himself up to date. He reiterated his readiness to provide us such information as we might need and recognized that the basis for exchange of information was most logically occasional exchange of views to keep each aware of the other's requirements.

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c. The new OSI liaison officer (Name not caught) is the first OSI-nik he has known. He appears quite impressed with him, particularly as he arranged a meeting with Col. TURNER of OSI Hq and introduced B to Col. Lynch, chief of OSI USAFE. Turner allegedly wrote B a letter inviting him to visit him on his arrival in Washington. (Comment: He did not mention CIC except to say he had visited Stuttgart and met Col. Clay and was impressed by the size of their file room and the fact that they were drowning in their own paper.)

3. Relations with other German Agencies.

a. He cited his excellent relations with Gehlen and said his fondest wish was to establish a personnel pool with the BND, not only for greater appreciation of mutual problems and procedures, bringing the work of the intelligence and executive services much closer together, but also to provide Gehlen with an outlet for compromised personnel. Under present civil service regulations Gehlen has to keep on pension officers who are no longer usable in clandestine work. B commented the SG could well use such officers in executive work and would thus be able to provide a safety valve for Gehlen as well as giving each agency a potential manpower reservoir for the other. He admitted this was a long range plan and he had not worked out the details of how to personnel dispense with present criminal police/requirements, although it was clear he was here again thinking about some version of the old political police where criminal police training would not necessarily be a prerequisite.

b. He is on good terms with Schruebbers, but there are still frictions and jealousies on the working levels. He cited the recent case of an arrested HVA resident on which the BfV had turned to the Koeln police rather than the SG. (Comment: this is the case reported to us by Bonn, which they thought was not known to the SG.)

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c. Of the 200 cases handled in 1957 by the SG, only ~~about~~ 2% were turned over to them by the intelligence services or AfV's. He cites this less as an

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example of the ineffectiveness of the intelligence services than as an indication of their lack of realization of the necessity for cooperation with the executive agencies. It is clearly also an indication of the amount of hostile activity in the Fedrep.

**4. Miscellaneous**

a. BfV - President Schruebbers has too little freedom of movement and appears to take too little initiative. BMI has for example forbidden him to talk to the press (B said he personally would not allow himself to be forbidden to talk) and S has taken it even in the face of such public slaps as the Spiegel has taken at BfV lately. The Spiegel reporter who did the piece on the Koeln brawl tried to see S and was refused.

**Thoughts**

b. BMI - there is no support for intelligence matters in the BMI. Neither is there any public relations sense. BARGATZKY, who heads the whole public safety side of the BMI has little time or interest for the security side which he considers basically a "dirty business". There was, for example, no BMI word of public support for BfV's GERKEN after the public pasting he took in the Spiegel on the CEBOTAREV case.

c. German IAC - B says time is not ripe for a common approach on coordination of interests, since Gehlen, the most prominent and respectable figure in the field is too preoccupied with his staffing and internal problems. I told B this was patent nonsense, that if G, with his prestige, were to take the initiative in setting up a committee of the heads of the various services, others would fall all over themselves to join up. The idea would be not any kind of a command setup to centralize intelligence and security, but a forum in which ~~various~~ problems of common concern could be aired ~~and~~ **SECRET** possible solutions found. The basic problem is the size of the opposition at work in the Fedrep and it makes no

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sense for a dozen different organs to be in open competition, jealously guarding what they believe to be their prerogatives. B said that the AfV system was poorly conceived to take advantage of such an idea; that as long as the [redacted] constitution gives the LfV's an independent status, there can never be effective coordination of [redacted] CI/CS work.

d. LfV Bavaria. RIEDMAIER is breaking in STURM, former [redacted] deputy chief of the LKA as his successor. He will retire shortly. Riedmaier's deputy Max NOETH has already retired. [redacted] B did not mention who the new deputy chief is or will be.

5. His own plans while here:

- a. Van Noy in Bonn arranged for B to have an appointment with J. Edgar Hoover, which is scheduled for 1000 on 10 May. *In*
- b. He asked us to change his appointment with Col Turner of CSI from 11 May to 9 May since he plans to go to NY the afternoon of 10 May and not return to Washington.
- c. He has set aside 5 and 6 May for us. His special interests are the HVA, NVA HA XIX, SED/KPD activities in Fedrep and the MfS harrassment campaign of letters and phoney induction orders to Bundeswehr candidates.

*OPW*

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